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Owner-occupied housing is said to be favored in the tax code because
rrortgage interest and property taxes can be deducted in the conputat ion of
one's incate tax base in spite of the fact that the returns from owner—
occupied housing are not taxed. The special tax treatnEnt reduces the
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The issue treated in this paper is the rreasuremant of the tax rate
to be employed in the user cost calculations. It is argued that different
tax rates are appropriate for the tenure choice and quantity—demanded
decisions, and that these values depend on the detailed tax posit ion of
the household and the mathod of finance. Average 1977 tax rates for
households in different incoma ranges are calculated using the NBER TAXSIM
microeconanic data file on individual tax returns.
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CXvner-occupied housing is said to be favored in the tax code because
mortgage interest and property taxes can be deducted in the cauput at ion
of'S inccfl tax base in spite of the fact that the returns from
owner-occupied housing are not taxed) This favored tax treatment should
generate a higher haTcmnership rate and greater demand for housing by
owner—occupiers than would otherwise exist. Saiie recent attempts to
rrasurethese impacts include Rosen (1979), Rosenand Rosen (1980),
King (1981)andHendershott (1980). Themethod employed is to measure
the real usercost ofcapital for owner—occupied housing andtorelate
boththe tenure choice and per unit housingdemanddecisionsto this and
other variables.
The issue in this paper is the rieasureTnt of the personal income
tax rate employed in the user cost calculations. Usually this tax rate
(r) is labeled the marginal tax rate of the household with little further
discussion. In the most detailed analysis, Diamond (1980) has argued
that T depends intricately on the particular tax position of the household,
including the household's nonhousing deductible expenses relative to its
standard deduction. We contend not only tbet t depends on the detailed
tax position of the househOld but that different values of T are relevant
to the tenure-choice and quantity-demanded decisions of the same house—
'Even if interest were not deductible, owner—occupied housing is favored relative
to investments that are taxed in that households donot paytaxes on the returns
ontheir equity investment in the house,—2—
hold. For the tenure-choice decision, the relevant tax variable is the
average tax savings per dollar of expense due to being an owner rather than
a renter of housing. For the quantity-demanded decision, the appropriate
tax variable is the tax saving due to a marginal dollar of owner-occupied
housing related expenses.
The present paper is divided into five sections. The first is dewted
to the conceptual neasuremant of r for the tenure—choice and quantity—
demanded decisior.. Section II describes the assunptions and precise
mathodology underlying the calculations of the tax rates and presents
a variôty of relevant household data by inceme class. In Section III, the
NBERTAXSIM file (see Feldstein and Frisch, 1977) is employedto calculate
the relevant T' s for households in different inca ranges based upon
tax retums filed for 1977, and these -r' s are then ccared with those
employed in other studies. In Section IV, we speculate on the impact of
abandoning the assusption of an exogenous tax law. Section V offerssciiie
concluding remarks.
I. Incci Taxes and Housing fcisicis
Consider a household with labor incone Y and wealth W. This wealth
can be invested at the interest rate i. Say that an inccine tax systan
exists in which rising marginal tax rates (t) are applied to additional
incone increnents (A). If this household chooses to rent a housing unit




where the expression in brackets is the total federal tax liability, tb Is
the marginal tax rate applied to the Ab incremanta]. segnt of taxable incoma,
t is the marginal tax rate on the last dollar of incorre, NIlE represents non-
housing related deductions, and R Is the rental outlay on the house. If this
sanE household owns a dlling worth V, its incare after taxes and housing
expenses (ya) is
=Y+i—(l-a)Vj- (t+ai)V - tAb+t4+i[W_(1Vj+(T+ai)VJ_Ab)1
(2)
=Y+iW -(i+)V-['ctbAb+tk(+iW_(i+TP)v -NIlE-
wherea isthe debt-financed portion of the housing investrrent andT isthe
propertytaxrate. It is assunedthatthe rate of retunearnedon nonhousing
investmant equals the mrt gage rate;it follows that incaie after housing
expensesbut before taxes is reduced by interest paynEnts on the entire value
of the housing investnent. Taxable inconE also declines by this an'ount (again,
the bracketed term is the total federal tax liability) because debt charges
a deductible from incone and the inplicit inca earned on equity does not
enter the taxable incczre base. Because taxable inconE is reduced relative to
the renter case, kn and tktn (given a progressive tax system).
Ofcourse,households can choose the alternative of a standard deduc-
tion (STD). If S'1D>NIIE for renters, then NIlE should be replaced by S'D in
equation (1). Forowners,NIlE + (T+a1)Vis replacedbySIT) if the latter
exceedsthe foniier. Note that the implicit interest on equity in the house
is excluded froni taxable incone whether or not the household itemizes.-4—




iW -(i+T)V— {tA+t+i[W-(1-a)V] —max{NHE+(t+cd)V,SLD}
Theseexpressions are useful in the derivation of the appropriate tax
rate to be employed in user cost calculations. Under sone simplifying assunp—
tions,2 the rental price or user cost for the owner's housing is
(3) C= [(l—T)(i+-r) —'rr+cS}V,
wheret is the relevant personal incone tax rate, is the depreciation
(maintenance) rate and is the expected rate of increase in the price of the
house. The user cost is the product of the price and the sun of the real
after—tax interest rate, the depreciation rate, and the net property tax
rate. The issue in this paper is the rneasurerrent of T.
First consider the owner' s decision regarding how much housing to purchase.
The relevant price is the opportunity cost of an incrntal dollar of hous-
ing. Ignoring the expected capital gain and depreciation ten that have no
tax implications,3 we can calculate C/V by finding —3Y/Vfranequation (2')
2These include: zero transactions costs, static expectations regarding future
inflation, interest, and tax rates, and treatment of debt and equity as earning
equal after—tax, risk—adjusted rates of return.
3Note that only current cash outlays on housing are netted out in equation (2),
while equation (3) includes an imputed net (of depreciation) appreciation term
as a negative cost.-5-
which is the foregone inconE (opportunity cost) due to purchasing a house.
As long as the owner is an itemizer at the margin of purchasing nore housing, then
_aI3v equals (l.tk)(i+rp). Thus in this case the appropriate interpretation of
T is tk the marginal tax rate. However, if at the margin the standard deduct-
ion istaken, then is (i —tk[(l_a)i/(i+TP)])(i+TP).The appropriate
tax valuebecctrstkweighted by (l-a)i/(i+t) which is the ratio of implicit
inccne on housing equity to the grossinterestandpropertytaxcostsof hous-
ing. For a nonitemizer, only this fraction of these costsreducesthe tax
liabilityat the margin.
Next considerthetenure choicedecision: should the household rent
or buy? Here the household will calipare the total opportunity cost of own-
ing (C, appropriately neasured)withthe rental chargeonan identicalhouse
(R).The ttobe employedin (3)in this calculationis the average percent
tax saving on all housing expenses (due to owning rather than renting). To
see this, note that the total opportunity cost ofbuyinga house is, again
ignoring capital gains and depreciation, Y—Y. Frcin equations (1') and (2'),
this is equal to (i+t)V —Rlessthe difference in federal tax liability
(the tenns in brackets) corresponding to the two altematives. This latter
difference is a canplicated temi depending on the marginal tax rates and
optional itemizing status in the renter and owner situations.
The results derived here are illustrated graphically in Figure 1.
The taxable inectre base is on the horizontal axis, and the marginal tax rate
is on the vertical axis. Assune for the mcnient that SI'D<NHE (the taxpayer
is an itemizer regardless of tenure choice) and ignore the vertical dashed
line in the figure. The tax rates paid on the last dollar of taxable incctnes
of renters andowners (Y0),respectively,are t and tk• The latter
is also the appropriate rate to use in the calculation of the user cost

























































































saving resulting frou a nrginal dollar of housing—related expenses. The
average taxraterelevant to the tenure choice G)isthe ratio of the slashed
area to (i-1- It is the ratio of total tax savin due to the purchase
of a house to the total opportunity cost of housing. Becauseis a woighted
average of tax rates ranging fiom tk to tn denoted by t,
=
tJç'>tfl•
'When the taxpayer would not be an itemizer if he chose the renter
tenure (S"TD>NHE), the vertical dashed line in the figure is operative,
and the relation between Tandtk is ambiguous. Assme
NIlE + (t+ai)V>D>NBE;
the household would be an itemizer if a house is purchased. Theni_s the
ratio of the hatched area to('r+i)V. Because the hatched area is the
pioduct of a weighted average of the tax rates betweentk and tm or
and (i+T)V -(STD-NIlE),we can write




- DNI1Etk T<tk as 1 -
(i+)V
ForS'ID sufficiently greater than NHE, (tk. Becausethestandard deduc-
tionis less likely to exceed nonhousing itemizedexpenses the higherthe
incorre of households, we wouldexpect /tk to rise with incone and eventually
exceed unity. The point hereis that when SID> NIlE, not allofthe
deductionsdue to hareownership are in fact net additions to the total of-8-
allowable deduct ions.4
An extrema example of this phenomanon occurs when the amount of
deductible expenses is less than the standard deduction, even in the honE—
owning case, i.e., when
STD>NHE +(r+cti)V.
Consider the appropriate tax rate for the decision of how much housing to
purchase. An additional dollar of V increases the anDunt of foregone invest-
mont inccv by (l'a)i dollars. Thus the housing purchase lowers taxable
incone by (1-a)iV or frc r toin Figure 2. The marginal tax rate at
that point is tk• The marginal tax saving on an additional dollar of
housing purchase, however, is Dnly ttk(l_cL)i/(i+TP). That is, taxable
incon declines by none of property tax expense and only the equity portion
of the financing expense.5 The value ofis the ratio of the slashed area
to (t+i)V. Thus r= Because tkrfl>tk, the tax rate relevant
to the tenure choice is necessarily greater that that relevant to the quantity
demanded decision.
The relationship betweenand the marginal tax rate relevant to the
quantity demanded decision, t, can be sumrized as follows:
'r>t when 1. STD>NI]E +(t +cd)V
or2. S'ID<NHE
41n 1977, STD>NHE for over half ofitemizing households in the inca ranges
(thousands of $)0-10,10-20, and 20—30 and over a quarter of households in
the 30—50 range. By definition, SID> NIlE for all nonitemizers.

























































































































t when NIlE <STD <NHE +(t +ai)V.
Note the anomaly thatis unambiguously greater than t both when NIlE
is very high and when NHE is very lcw (along with V).
III. Calculation Wthodology and Underlying Data
In this section we describe the precise procedures and calculations
underlying the computations and discuss our data set.
Assuiipt ions and Prëcisë tikthbdOlogy
The calculations are perfond in two steps. The first entails
computationof the inccnand tax liabilityof an owning household if it
instead were renting housing services. We add on estimate of the interest
foregoneoniner equitytothe household's recordedbefore-taxincone.
(4) =+ (l-c3)i\r,
whereis the recorded income (labor and nonhousing capital) of the house-
hold, I is the current mortgage rate, and c and V3 are estimates of the
current loan—to—value ratio and house value of the household. The Y3
value is from the NBER TAXSIM file for 1977, and i (0.0901) is the
average new mortgage rate in 1977 (1980 EOnomiC Report Of the President).
(The specification of V3 and cz3 will be discussed shortly.) The taxable
inccir of this household, if it had rented, would be
(5) TAXI& =Y-max(NIlE,s'rJ))





The second step is calculation of the inoon andtaxliability of the
household if it had becaie an owner in 1977. We begin with the household' s
theoretical income as a renter from equation (4), reduce it by the interest
incc*m foregone on the own equity investnent assuming that the household
would have a loan-to—value ratio of Clnew and then allow potential housing-
related tax deductionsequal to (a i+t)V3




Taxes are computed as in (6), after replacing TAX& and TAXI& with TAXO3
and TAXICY.
The tax rate relevant to the tenure choice is
-.TAX&-TAXO. (8).=
(i-t-T)V3
Expression(8) is the ratio of the total tax savingfromowning tothe
totalcost of owning a house. The tax rate relevant to the quantity of owner—
occupied housing demanded is




Expression (9) is the ratio of the tax saving frciii an additional dollar
of owner-occupied housing related expenses to the cost of the additional
dollar of housing.
The specification of c ,V, aid remains to be dis cussed. At
any point in tii, k,is the ratio of the outst aiding ma'tgprin dpal
PRIN, to the current h cuse market value, V. Lnote the h wse pri ce
and loan-to—value ratio at time of purche by V3 andand let i0 aid





Further,sith at the hasehsrisen in value at theannual rate
-since timeofpurdieor th at V3 =(i+r1_(5)kv .Then o k o o
(1÷)M —(1÷.)k
(10) CL= M [(1+1) —1](1+ir —(5)
Asn be seen, the current cdependson how long o the househ oldobt ained
thenDrtge, whatthe mertggeratew at that tii, i0, what loan-to-.
valueratio w obtained, candwhat the net appreciation on the house
has been, r'0
Although none of these values are known to us, we do h ave sare infoim aticn
which would allow us to estimate theandwith reasonable accuracy. For
itnizers we know property tax paynnts,whichare related through the effec-
fi property tax rate to house value. The relevant relationship is A
6Tcanes frcm dividing total property tax payments i.n 1975 ($5L5 billion)
total assessed value of property in th at year ($1063.9 billion) and
applyingaratio of assessed value to market value (0.327, from 1972
Census of Covernments).—13—
We also know rrortgage paynents, which are a function of i0 arid ctBy
sun]ing s are simple functional relationships between these vanles, we
can estim ae for each household. This procedure is explained in Appendix A.
For nonitemizers, neither property tpaynents nor nftg ge payments
are known. Thus we not only h ave no w rtoestimate a3, we als o cannot tell
if the hcusehold owns or rents h aising. Our procedure in these cases is
to assiga hcneowning or renting status randcinly to the nonitemizers. For
those that are presuned to be renters, there is no foregone interest on
equity, so a is set equal to unity. For those that are presi..ued to be hare—
owners, a is uncbubtedly a low nlxrt)er (they borrowed at a low rate sane tine
ago and thus S'lD>[NHE +(ai+r)V]such as 0.2, on average. On the basis
of other information, we have determined the fraction of nonitemizers who
are hcneowners, by incane as7 Thus, values of a=i .0 and 0.2 are ran cbmly
assigned to nonitemizers, with the porportion receiving each value depend-
ing on incone.
The paraneter is not the initial loan—to—value ratio. This would new
be the appropriate parameter only if the household were to increase the
nort gage pan passu with the net appreciation of the house. bre likely,
the riort gage is anortized. The appropriate4'flewis a discounted weighted
average of theover the assurred life of the nDrtgage. With the latter
71f0T is the ownership rate for all households in the incorre class, 01 is
the ownership rate for itemizers, °N is the ownership rate for nonitemizers
and w is the fraction of households in the incone class that itemize, then
cwo1 +(1-w)°N We know oT and w, and o is the fraction of itemizers
with positive property tax paynents. Thus we can solve for°N For the lowest



















































































































152 250 758 2036—15—
equalto 10 years, we compute
10 110
cv.- k f 1
newZ_.[i + (1 )iJ
k
÷ (l—1)iJk
%theretheare based onthe current (1977) nDrtgage tenns andtheexpected
futurenet appreciation rate, and (l— )1 is the nczTlinal after-tax discount
rate. With i =0.09,M =26years,=0.75,'r- =0.045,and (l—T)i=0.0675,
The Underlying Data
SalE relevant data are listed in Table 1 by AGI (adjusted gross incaie)
class. In 1977, virtually half of households (husband-wife family, other
family, and primary individuals) had inconE under $10, 000 while only 1.6
percent had inconE over $50,000. Nonetheless, households on the bottom
half of the inconE ladder earned only one-sixth of total incare, while the
highest 1.6 percent earned over 10 percent.
Both the horneownership rate and proportion of households that itemize
rise nDnotonically with in cone .Thiscorrespondence is not coincidence,
as is indicated by the very high percentage (97) of itemizers who pay
property taxes (i.e., own homes). Ckily a quarter of all households itemized
in 1977, but over 90 percent of households with incorre above $40, 000 did
(less than 5 percent of households on the lower half of the income ladder did).
Table 1 also lists the average property tax paynEnts of itemizers by incalE
class and their implied house value (PrAX/ where0.0154). Ncniteniizers
and renting itemizers create a problem in that property taxes (and thus those
8The nDrtgage tenis are theaverages for conventional nnrtgages closed in
1977 (11BB Journal, Table S.5. 1). .Azrortizat ion alone 1ors fran 0.75
to 0.63 in 10 years. The net house appreciation lowers it further to 0.40.—16-
value) are not available. Half of nonitemizers are owners, and hypothetical
house values must be attributed to all renters in the calculation of their
taxable incczre if they were owners. For these purposes, the V's in Table 1
are attributed to nonitemizers and renting itemizers with incams in the
relevant ranges.
The final problem is estimation of potential NilE for nonitemizers. It
is invalid to assii that the distribution of NHE' (conditional on incar, if
this explains potential deductions) is the same for nonitemizers as it is
for itemizers because the choice of nonitemizing status itself depends on
potential NIlE'. Specifically, we 'wt)uld expect that potential NIlE' will be
lower for the nonitemizers than itemizers and that the crucial surplus
standard deduction will be higher. Thus, any calculation offor itemizers
only will be biased upward as an estimate of averagein an income class
because it tends to include mere people who have extraordinarily high NilE'
(and possibly PThX and INT). We have developed a procedure for generating
an unbiased distribution of NilE to be attributed to non itemizers and have
employed it in our calculations of the .Thisprocedure is described in
Appendix B The average values of the imputed surplus standard dedactions are
presented in Table 1, beside the actual average values for itemizers. As
expected, they are uniformnly higher for nonitemizers than itemizers.
III. Estimated Tax Rates
The estimated tax rates are reported in Table 2. Begthining with the
itemizers, the difference betweenand t1 axe not large. We do find
for the lowest and the three highest incae classes, i.e., when
NilE is especially low or high. In the $20.-30 thousand range,t1 slightly
exceeds F1, reflecting S!ID NHE. For nonitemizers, thetN s are roughly
9The procedure is basedupon Hausman and Wise (1977).Table 2: Calculated Tax RatesforTenure (loice and Quantity





a= +(1—.)TN, whereis the fraction of class that itemized
in 1977; t is defined similarly.
bere are no nonitemizers with AGI over $50,000 in our sample. In
general, 95 percent of households with AGI over $50,000itemized in
1977.
dian husband—wife family incDne +$1•


















































cosparable to those of itemizers, but thes are 0.04 to 0.06 lower.
This reflects the greater surplus standard deduction of nonitemizers relative
to itemizerP The last two coluniis are weighted average 's and t s for
itemizers and nonitemizers.<t for incenes belcv about $35 ,000. The
largest difference betweenandtoccursin the $10—20 thousand bracket,
where T is 28 percent less than t, and 30 percent of households fall in this
inconE range.
If one were to calculate single tax rates relevant to the tenure—choice
and quantity-derrnded decisions (andtA, respectively), they would be
weighted averages of the 's and t's, respectively. For tenure choice, the
portion of households in the different incc classes (h.) would seem to
be the appropriate weights:
TA =h1,
wherethe h1 are given in Table 1. The appropriate weights for conputing
the aggregate tA would appear to be the shares of incai earned by hcti—




roughlyhalfof the sample of nonitemi.zers whowere honeowners in 1977
wouldvirtually all haveitemized hadtheybeenfinancingat and I =0.0901.
InourcalcJations,they do, indeed, itemize. Thisswitch infiling status
mightleadthem to increasetheirnonhousing expensesand thuslower their excess
standard deduction, thereby raising .Tothe extent that nonhousing expenses
areresponsive, we have overstated the difference between t and .-.19—
The results of these calculations areTA =0.137,tA =0.274.While the
individualand t1 are not that different, significant differences in the
h1 and the y.o. lead to a large difference in the relevant aggregate tax
rates to employ is user cost calculations for the two distinct housing
decisions.
As noted in the introduction to this paper, the nDst detailed earlier
study is that of Dianond (1980). He correctly recognizes the relevance of
both the implicit income earned on owner's equity (the entire financing cost,
not jist c. of it, lowers the taxable incane base) and the "surplus" standard
deduction (STD -NIlEacts as an offset to deductible housing expense
including the equity cost —inthe calculation of ).Furthenre,he distin-
guishes between the tax rate effects on the tenure and housing demand decisions.
Hcvever, his calculations, which refer only to the median inCC1T, husband—wife
family that itemized, differ fran those we prested for this group in two ways.
Ci a conceptual level, Dianond does not distinguish between the marginal
tax rates relevant to the quantity demanded decision and to the calculation
of .Ina progressive tax system, the former will be less than the latter.
In teniE of the synbols employed in the discussion of Figure 1,tk<tm The
rate utilized by Dianond (tm) for both calculations is greater than either
of these rates. Thus, his t for the quantity—demanded decision, 0.22, exceeds
the 0.191 we have caiiputed.
(Ii an empirical level, Dianond assumes that nonhousing deductible expenses
for the median-income, husband-wife family anounted to $880 in 1977. Thus,
,320 (the standard deduction of $3200 minus $880) of the deduction; due to
owning a house are assumed not to provide a net reduction in taxable incai.
This anounts to 50 percent of our estimate of the total potential tax reduction-20-
to owning." In contrast, ourresultsutilize the average anDunt of non—
housing deductions actually reported by itemizers in canputing the excess
standard deduction, or $758. Thus, only 17 percent of the total potential
tax reduction due to hareowning is lost in our calculation. As a result,
]lLanxiid's calculation ofis, by our conputation, only 0.110, far less than
our 0.179.
Rosen and Rosen (1980) assurr that the nidian (incane) household would
itemize, which is correct given anew and the current i, but they use historic
housing expense deductions based upon far lower a and i values. Application
of their nEthodology to 1977 would give a tax rate of about 0.2, or 44 percent
greater than the household-weighted econonp-wide value we propose for explaining
tenure choice.
deLeeuw and Ozanne (1979) employ a tax rate of 0.30 in their analysis
of the quantity-derrnded decision. This rate is cc*nputed as an inconE—
weighted average of imrginal tax rates of owners, i.e., is equivalent to tA
Data fran the Brookings tax file for 1970 were enployed. While the procedure
seens appropriate, the 0.30 rate is too high. Owing to bracket crep, we would
expect tA for 1970 to be less than that for 1977, i.e., 0.274. We suspect
that deleeuw and Ozanne used actual housing deductions for 1970 based on
historic at s and i's rather than aand the i for 1970. new
IV. A Ik)ssible Extension: Ehdogenous Tax Law
In our view, the principal weakness in the present analysis is the inplicit
assurrption that the tax law (the t1 and S'ID) is fixed for all tinE. This is
not a particularly appealing assumption, and it could be irrportant to the cal—
culation. of the tax rates relevant to housing decisions.
That is, 2,320/ (i +)V =0.5.—21—
Consider the t1. If governnnt expenditures financed by incone tas
are expected to grow over tinE as a share of (NP, then the t1 would be
expected to rise. Experience in the U. S. over the previous decade would
have led a rational household in 1977 to expect rising t, even net of pert—
ôdic tax 'Tcuts." Higher future t1 would raise both TA and tA if they, like a,
were ccinputed in a discounted present valus manner, although the increases
would likely not be substantial.
Future expected changes in &ID might have a greater impact. In 1977,
26 percent of households itemized, virtually, all of which were hcnEowners.
f all of these owners refinanced at I =0.09with an ,aof 0.6 then new
practically all owners would itIze. Of course, at any point in tine
many owners will have a's less than 06, sai far less. Nonetheless, with
no further changes in I and no change in S1D, the proportion of households
itemizing could well double. This would alnost certainly lead the Treasury
to seek, and Congress to legislate, a major increase in
The inact of an increase in STD on the tax rates relevant to housing
decisions depends on the incoma level, preferences for housing, and non—
housing deductible expenses of households. The impact of an increase in
S'ID to S'ID* on and t depends on the vahe of SID* relative to values of
NHE and deductible housing expenses, as shown in Table 3. For very high
ncone households, bothand t would be unaffected; for scmethat lower
incan', alone would decline; for low to noderate incone house-
holds, bothand t would decline. Because the economy-wide average tax
rate relevant to the quantity-demanded decision (tA) is incone weighted,
the decline in this rate would not be large. In fact, given the expectation
increases in the standard deduetion have been defended on the grounds
of reducing the proportion of itemizing households and the additional adntinis-
strative and conipliànce costs itemizing entails. See, for example, Senate
port #91-552 on the Tax Reform Act of 1969, pp. 584—586.—22-
Table 3: The Impactof an Increase in the Standard Deduction horn
S'D to D'
Income Level of I2nct
Relative Value of $J)* Households Affected t
*<NHE very high 0 0
NHE <STD < NIlE +(i+T)V moderate to high 0
STD*> jjE +(crj+r)v low to moderate 4—23—
of rising t discussed above, our estimate oftA is probably reasonable, However,
the economy-with average tax rate relevant to tenure choice is household weighted.
Thus a significant increase in SI!) weuld undoubtedly lower A significantly. As
a result, even our low 0.137 estirrate is probably too high. That is, the tax
rate relevant to the tenure decision on an economy—wide basis is probably less
than half that relevant to the quantity demanded decision.
V. Surrnary
Conceptually, the tax rate5 relevant to the quantity demanded (t) and tenure
choice (T) decisions are different, although which is higher is unclear. With
no excess standard deduction (with S'ID<NIIE), thon, t( But with STD>NHE, we
could easily have t >.
In1977, t —<0.02for itemizers in each of our six income classes.
Thus, for example, t and are quite close (0.191 and 0.179 respectively) for
itemizing husband—wife families with the madian inccire (in contrast to Diamondt s
calculations). For nonitemizers (with SI!) NIlE by definition), t is greater
than T by as much as 0.08. In percentage terns, t is over 25 percent greater
thanfor over 60 percent of these households. Thus it appeare to be important
to distinguish between t and in a microeconanic study that includes nonitemizers.
C an economy-wide basis, we compute tA =0.274and TA= 0.137.This
result follows from the different weighting schemas employed in the calculations.
The weights for the incoma class t s are the portion of total honEowner i.ncone
eamed by hareowners in the various incone classes; the weights for the incone
class 'sare the portion of total honeowners in the various incone classes.
Thus, the appropriate tax rate to use in the computation of the user cost employed
in the estimation of an aggregate tenure choice equation might be only half
that employed in the estimation of an aggregate quantity demanded equation.-24-
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The ratio of current interest paynnts to the current va1t of the




tnote ir& /V3 by X3 =INT3/(PTAX3/.0154).Then
j 29ui'\
lkaOk o1
'thereis the current coupon rate, 0. 09, andis the original loan—to-vali




We know that i has risen through tE and thus that 1/ .09 is smaller
the larger is t (the further back is o). Of course, c4/. 75 falls through
tine with the impact of amortization and net appreciation. We make the




Givenand X3, we can deteniiine .Itis reasonable to require additionally
that 0<c<0.85, unless rx3 =0,in which case=1.0.As for ,based
on inspection of the tinE path of mortgage rates, we have chosen a value of
0.25.tppendix B
A Procedure for Cenerating a Distributioii of Nhousing Deductions for Nonitemizers
In order to calculate t' andfor nonitanizers, a value for potential
nonhousing-related deductions is needed. It is invalid to assurre that the
distribution of NilE' (conditional on incon, if this explains potential deduct-
ions) is the sane for nanitemizers as it is for itemizers because the choice
of nonitemizing itself depends on potential NHE'. Specifically, ve would
expect that potential NHE' will be lower for the nonitemizers than itemizers.
Thus, any calculation of T for itemizers only will be biased upward as an
estimate of average T in an incon class because it tends to include nore
people who have extraordinarily high}]E1 (and possibly PTAX and INT).
We generate an unbiased distribution of NHE1 for nonitemizers as
follows. Assi that NilE and housing related expenses [H =(i+cd
)V I




where 1,-#N (((i)l 12
L12 2 L2 2
andY1 is adjusted gross incon.
Now define the sum of NIlE' and 111 as 'iur'.'Whatve observe in the
TAX$IM file is the distribution of H, NIlE', and 1U1,13—2
conditional on 'IOT' $fl)1,whererD1 is the standard deduction (which
depends on the marital status of the taxpaying unit). Thus an observation
is in the sample only if
(3) NIlE' +
(4)or(a+b)Y1++cS1D'.
Theprobability that the observation is in the sample is





(7) prob () =)f(u)du
=1—F1-(a+b)Y'}
-(a+b)Y1)/a
wheref is the probability density function ofthe normal distribution,
Fis the curailative density function, and a is equal to (cr +c +2a1/2






























wherek isa constant.Thiscan be further simplified to
222 1 1







12 1 +CT + 2a12)
1/2)
Expression(12) was maximized with respect to a, b, a, a, and
using a nunrical optimization algorithm. In order to reduce corrputational
expense, the optimization was carried out on arandon sarrple of 300 observations
of joint filers, whose relevant standard deduction anDunted to $3200in 1977.






Thefinalstepis to use these estimates to generate a distribution of
potentialNIlE to be attached to thenonitemizerson the TAXSIM file.A
randomgenerator with a joint nonmi distribution described by the est:hnated
paraireters was used to produce drawings ofand .Foreach nonitemizer
in the file, ve calculate(a+ b)Y1.Then 'nkea.drawingof and62.
If (a +b)Y1+(c+) is less thanthe standard deduction appropriate to
thetaxpaying unit,thenaY1 +isattached to the file as the anDuntof
NIlE that is available to the individual. If (a +b)Y'+(E] +62)is greater
than the standard deduction, another drawing ofand 62 is made. The
process continues until a drawing of E]+62is sufficiently lcw so as to nke
(a +b)Y'-E(+62) lessthan SD. If the accepted aY1 +isless than zero,
then a value of zero is attached; if aY1 +isnre than the standard deduc-
tion, then the standard deduction is attached. (Both these situations are
possible because reasonable values ofH' andNIlE' are nonnegative, but the
nonnal distribution cbes not, of course, recognize such economically mean ing-
ful truncations.)
This procedure encountered the problem that the dispersion of the estii.ted
distributions of H1 and was so large that a very large fraction of the
imputations of ended up being either zero or the standard deduction. In
order to generate a rrore reasonable distribution, the maximum likelihood
procedure was re-estimated on a san1e of taxpaying units with AGI less thanB—5
$50,000. By eliminating the high incon nonitemizers fran the sanpie, the
estin.ted dispersion was substantially reduced. However, the fraction of
imputations at the extren values was still quite high. To reduce the
frequency of this, the imputations used a variance—covariance structure
equal to one-ninth tines the estimated values. Thus, in the reported




2 6 a =1.284x 10
2 5 a =5.889x 10
=3.227x 10